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Motor freight brokers are the connecting link between shippers
and carriers, uniting shippers who have cargo to deliver with carriers
who have available motor transportation.' Acting as traffic managers
for shippers and sales agents for carriers, brokers arrange thousands
of transactions each day, many of which either start or end up in the
international stream of commerce. If used effectively, brokers can
lower the transportation costs of domestic and international shippers
and increase the revenue of carriers, which ultimately will stimulate
interstate and overseas trade.
Freight brokers arrange shipments for both domestic and over-
seas shippers. A typical international brokerage transaction occurs as
follows:
An international manufacturer ("shipper") hires an ocean liner or air
carrier to transport its freight to the United States. Before the goods
arrive in the U.S., the manufacturer retains a freight broker who, in turn,
hires a trucking company ("carrier") to haul the freight from the port of
entry to the fimal destination within the United States. The international
* Assistant Professor of Law, Marquette University School of Law.
1 As used herein, the term "freight brokers" means brokers of property and does not in-
clude brokers of passengers or brokers of household goods.
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manufacturer has the option to bypass the broker and deal directly with
the trucking company, but most foreign entities are unfamiliar with the
U.S. transportation market and are thus dependent upon brokerage
services. After delivery is made, the broker collects the entire motor
freight charge from the shipper. The shipper expects the broker to remit
a portion of this payment to the carrier, but often the broker absconds
with the funds leaving the carrier and shipper to quarrel over payment.
2
Freight brokers have the potential to play a pivotal role in the
movement of interstate and foreign commerce. A reputable broker-
age industry would enhance the availability of dependable, reasonably
priced service to all segments of the transportation market, not only
within the United States but throughout the world.3 Brokerage ser-
vice will be particularly important in the coming decade, as countries
begin to lower trade barriers with multilateral agreements such as the
European Community and North American Free Trade Agreement.
The brokerage industry, however, is riddled with serious problems
that are threatening its very existence.
Most brokerage problems are traceable to the troubled history of
freight brokers, which has been a constant struggle between regula-
tion and deregulation. Arguably, brokers have been subjected to
more extremist regulation than any other industry during the last fifty
years. The pattern of extremism began when Congress imposed mas-
sive regulations on freight brokers as part of the Motor Carrier Act of
1935.1 The 1935 regulations completely stifled the U.S. brokerage in-
dustry.' Forty-five years later, Congress moved to the other regula-
tory extreme when it passed the Motor Carrier Act of 1980,6 which
virtually deregulated the brokerage industry.7 The eased entry con-
trols of the 1980 Act have led to considerable broker abuse.8 Since
2 This is merely an example of the problems associated with the U.S. brokerage market. See
Section IV, infra, for additional examples of broker abuse. Domestic shippers face these same
problems, except that there is no ocean or air carrier involved.
3 Gregory J. Stachura, LICENSED PROPERTY BROKERS: THEIR ROLE IN TRANSPORTATION
SERVICE 1 (1991) (available at Transportation Brokers Conference of America).
4 Motor Carrier Act of 1935, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-27 (1970) (hereinafter the "1935 Act").
5 TERRANCE A. BROWN, TRANSPORTATION BROKERS: HISTORY, REGULATION AND OPER-
ATIONs 64 (1992); JOHN P. MARTELL, BROKERS IN TRANSPORTATION 9 (1984) (as few as seven
active brokers existed in the early 1970s).
6 Motor Carrier Act of 1980, 49 U.S.C. §§ 10924-10927 (1980) (hereinafter the "1980 Act").
7 lId § 10924.
8 See, e.g., Dave Russ, Could You, Should You, Use a Broker; Property Brokers in Transpor-
tation, 24 TRANSp. & DISTRmIUTION 30 (a common joke about brokers is: A traffic manager
summons a motor carrier, a railroad sales representative and a freight broker to his office indi-
vidually and asks each "what is two plus two?" The motor carrier and railroad representative
each answer "four." The broker, on the other hand, pulls down the shades, closes the door, leans
over the desk, and replies "what do you want it to be?").
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deregulation, the industry has been inundated with undercapitalized,
fly-by-night brokers who are preying on unsuspecting carriers and
shippers.9 While the strict entry controls of the 1935 Act stifled the
brokerage industry's development, the eased entry controls of the
1980 Act resulted in higher prices, financial instability, protracted liti-
gation1' and an increase in bankruptcies."1 Due to this regulatory
pandemonium, brokers present an exemplary microcosm of the intrin-
sic struggle between the forces of regulation and deregulation.
The lack of financial certainty in the brokerage industry has
harmed domestic and international shippers alike. Disreputable bro-
kers, whose only goal is to make a quick dollar, have taken a toll on
both imports and exports. Broker abuse has cost U.S. shippers and
carriers millions of dollars but, more importantly, broker abuse is be-
ginning to adversely effect international trade. U.S. manufacturers
who export goods overseas, for instance, have been forced to pay
twice for the same shipment of goods because of untrustworthy mid-
dlemen.12 Likewise, international manufacturers who import goods to
the United States have faced "double payment" upon arrival in this
country because the intermediaries they hired absconded with the ini-
tial funds. 3
Broker misconduct is especially destructive in the international
market. Brokers typically arrange transportation for small or mid-
sized manufactures. If these manufacturers are based overseas, they
usually have little familiarity with the U.S. freight carriage industry.
9 See generally Judith A. Fuerst, Sorting Out the Middlemen: Keeping the Wheels of Distri-
bution in Motion, Third Parties Make Matches Between Shippers and Carriers, 26 TRANsP. AND
DISTRIBUTION 46.
10 See, eg., ANR Freight System, Inc. v. Weldbend Corporation, No. 90 C 1948, 1993 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3558 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 1993).
11 See, e.g., Transportation Property Brokers: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Surface
Transp. of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transp., 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14
(1987) (hereinafter "1987 Hearing"). Many persons unfamiliar with interstate transportation
have started freight brokerage operations knowing virtually nothing about brokerage services or
operating procedures. Senn Trucking Co., Lawful Practices of Property Brokers, Petition for
Rulemaking, No. 39962, 1986 M.C.C. LEXIS 74, at *1 (I.C.C. Nov. 17, 1986).
12 See, e.g., Johnson Products Co. v. M/V LA Molinera, 628 F. Supp. 1240 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(shipper successfully sued international transportation intermediary to recover double payment);
Farrell Lines, Inc. v. Titan Industrial Corp., 306 F. Supp. 1348 (S.D.N.Y.) (ocean carrier unsuc-
cessfully sued domestic exporter to recover freight charges which exporter had previously paid
to forwarder); Randy Intern., Ltd. v. American Excess Corp., 501 So. 2d 667 (Fla. App. 1987)
(shipper unsuccessfully sued freight forwarder to recover second payment made on export of
goods).
13 Olympic Airways, S.A. v. Aeolian Shipping Co., N.Y.LU., Jun. 14, 1979, at 10 (interna-
tional shipper exporting freight to the U.S. forced to pay the same freight bill twice before the
carrier would release the goods).
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As a result, international shippers must often rely on freight brokers
to arrange motor transportation for their freight once it arrives in a
U.S. port. Cognizant of this reliance, brokers frequently extort exces-
sive freight charges from international shippers. More often than not,
the international shipper's only recourse is in the U.S. court system.
To foreigners, U.S. courts are confusing, costly and intimidating, and
thus many international shippers are left without adequate recourse
against disreputable brokers. If the freight brokerage industry contin-
ues on its current path, a time will come when international shippers,
who essentially require the services of freight middlemen, will discon-
tinue, or at the very least decrease, business with companies in the
United States because it is no longer economically feasible to trans-
port their freight. The brokerage industry's ills must be cured before
this occurs.
The answer to the brokerage industry's problems lies somewhere
between the two extremes of massive regulation and total deregula-
tion. Congress needs to find an amicable middleground between the
stifling regulation of the past and the unstable deregulation of the
present. Responsible regulations can be enacted to stabilize the bro-
kerage industry without imposing undue financial or administrative
burdens on brokers and without unnecessarily impeding competition.
This article proposes a set of regulations which, if enacted, will pro-
vide stability to an industry that has teetered on the brink of disaster
since 1935.1'
Because licensed brokers act as conduits for millions of dollars of
freight charges per year, safeguards are needed to ensure that fit and
able brokers are allowed entry into the market regardless of existing
competition, while excluding undercapitalized and unfit applicants.
The proposed regulations, therefore, limit entry to those who have
adequate capital.' 5 The proposed regulations also outline certain pay-
ment and collection duties of brokers, place restrictions on the funds
collected by brokers, and allocate property damage and personal in-
jury liability among brokers and carriers. These regulations will pro-
tect domestic and international shippers, carriers and honest brokers
at the expense of dishonest, fly-by-night brokers.
14 The proposed regulations are entirely consistent with the new administration's view that
positive economic change can be achieved through responsible federal legislation. ICC Chair-
man Gail McDonald's Address to Raritan Traffic Club on Current Issues, ICC's Role and Future
Trends, I.C.C. News Release, 1993 Westlaw 69259, at *5 (Mar. 10, 1993).
15 Some applicants with very limited financial means may be excluded from the market, but
these are the same individuals who are causing the current instability.
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The proposed regulations are required for three reasons. First,
the current system of deregulation chooses expensive and unproduc-
tive litigation over responsible regulations. Transportation entities are
compelled to seek recourse in court for every minor dispute involving
a broker.16 These lawsuits are attributable to the lack of regulations
defining a broker's duties and responsibilities, particularly those re-
garding the collection of freight charges. The costs that the transpor-
tation industry incurs in litigation far exceeds the costs it will incur
under the proposed regulations. 17 Therefore, the proposed regula-
tions should result in an overall cost savings for the transportation
sector, which, in turn, should stimulate international trade.
Second, intermediaries by their very nature live entirely off the
labor of others. As such, intermediary professions seem to attract a
substantial share of knaves. Because of this inherent problem, in-
termediaries who handle large sums of money for other parties, such
as lawyers, stockbrokers, real estate brokers and trustees, are heavily
regulated.18 No one would advocate repealing this legislation. 9
Freight brokers, like these other intermediaries, are in a position of
responsibility which requires them to handle large sums of money for
other parties. As a result, regulations are needed to govern their
activities.2'
Third, the brokerage industry has been particularly hard hit by
deregulation. The ICC has been issuing broker licenses at a
breakneck pace over the last fifteen years. Even convicted felons
have managed to enter the brokerage industry.2' It has become diffi-
cult, therefore, to locate a financially sound and reputable broker, and
16 See, e-g., Thrasher Trucking Co. v. Empire Tubular, Inc., 983 F.2d 46 (5th Cir. 1993) (claim
by broker for undercharges); Atlantis Express, Inc. v. Standard Transp. Services, 955 F.2d 529
(8th Cir. 1992) (carrier's action to collect freight charges from broker); Milan Express Co. v.
Western Surety Co., 886 F.2d 783 (6th Cir. 1989) (carrier's action to recover on broker's surety
bond).
17 Judicial review consumes vast amounts of time, energy and money and therefore is not a
viable substitute for ICC regulation and oversight; Paul S. Dempsey, The Interstate Commerce
Commission - Disintegration of an American Legal Institution, 34 AM. U. L. Rsv. 1, 50 (1984).
18 Attorneys and real estate brokers are governed by codes of professional conduct. See,
e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.15 (1989); National Assoc. of Realtors,
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CODE OF Enmcs, art. 18 (8th ed. 1984). Stockbrokers and trustees
are governed by common law and statutory law. See, eg., Louis Loss & JOEL SELiGMAN, 7
SECURTIES REGULATION 3169-71 (3d ed. 1991); AusTN W. SCOTT AND WILLIAM B. FRATCHER,
2A THE LAW OF TRusTs § 179.1 (4th ed. 1987).
19 See, e.g., MARTELL, supra note 5, at 144.
20 The situation in the freight brokerage industry is similar to that in the real estate broker-
age industry: brokers perform services for the benefit of two parties simultaneously. Property
Broker Practices, 132 M.C.C. 233 (1980).
21 See Wilkett v. I.C.C., 710 F.2d 861 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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the distrust of brokers has permeated the entire transportation sector.
Regulations are desperately needed to instill trust into the brokerage
industry.
Section II of this article depicts the brokerage industry as it exists
today. Section III details the history of federal regulation of freight
brokers. Section IV illustrates the recurring problems posed by un-
regulated and undercapitalized brokers. Finally, section V proposes a
series of regulations that are intended to cure many of the current ills
of the brokerage industry.
II. FREIG~i-r BROKERS
Freight brokers are the connecting link between trucking compa-
nies and shippers.22 A broker is defined by the ICC as:
[a] person who, for compensation, arranges, or offers to arrange, the
transportation of property by an authorized motor carrier. Motor carri-
ers, or persons who are employees or bona fide agents of motor carriers,
are not brokers within the meaning of this section when they arrange or
offer to arrange transportation of shipments which they are authorized
to transport from which they have accepted and legally bound them-
selves to transport.23
Acting in a traffic role for the shipper and in a sales role for the
carrier, brokers play an essential role in bringing goods to market by
filling the gap between motor carriers and shippers.24 Freight brokers
participate in thousands of daily transactions between shippers and
22 David Dinell, Transportation Brokers Fill Deregulation Void, 7 WICHITA Bus. J., Mar. 6,
1992, at 11.
23 49 C.F.R. § 1045.2(a) (1992). A broker is also defined as "a person, other than a motor
carrier or an employee or agent of a motor carrier, that as a principal or agent, sells, offers for
sale, negotiates for, or holds itself out by solicitation, advertisement, or otherwise as selling,
providing, or arranging for, transportation by motor carrier for compensation." 49 U.S.C.
§ 10102(1) (1979).
24 Milan Express Co. v. Western Sur. Co., 886 F.2d 783, 784 (6th Cir. 1989). Brokerage
service is defined as "the arranging of transportation or the physical movement of a motor vehi-
cle or of property.... on behalf of a motor carrier or [shipper]." 49 C.F.R. § 1045.2(c) (1992). A
broker offers the following services:
(1) Solicits traffic in lieu of carrier sales staff;
(2) Dispatches shipments and carrier equipment;
(3) Locates owner-operators or trip lease equipment;
(4) Verifies carrier insurance;
(5) Verifies carrier authority;
(6) Verifies carrier rates and charges;
(7) Prepares trip lease documentation;
(8) Instructs owner-operators on a carrier's procedures;
(9) Inspects equipment on a trip lease;
(10) Issues authorized carrier door placards;
(11) Advances funds;
(12) Supervises drivers; and
(13) Arranges rail-motor routings.
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carriers;25 they arrange transportation for approximately two billion
dollars of freight traffic per year.26 Brokers are the most utilized in-
termediaries in the transportation industry,2 7 handling nearly twenty
percent of the nation's freight traffic.28
Brokerage services are performed for the benefit of both shippers
and carriers. 29 Brokers provide valuable information to carriers on
price and service availability; they arrange for carriers to pick up and
deliver freight on a daily basis; and participate in scheduling, collec-
tion, billing, damage evaluation and other carrier functions."0 They
provide carriers with an additional source of traffic which can improve
the balance of a carrier's traffic lanes.3 ' But, most importantly, bro-
kers arrange "backhaul" service for carriers. If a Chicago-based car-
rier has a shipment of freight to deliver to Denver, the carrier faces
the unappealing prospect of returning to Chicago with an empty
truck.3 2 By using a broker, the carrier can arrange to backhaul a load
from Denver to Chicago and not only avoid the costs of returning
empty, but also make a profit on the backhaul 3 If used effectively,
brokers can reduce empty truck miles and generate additional reve-
nue for carriers.3 4
Brokers also perform valuable services for both large and small
shippers, often performing the tasks of a small shipper's traffic depart-
ment.3 5 This is a particularly important role for international shippers,
who are often unfamiliar with U.S. carriers. Brokers offer shippers an
Norman A. Cooper, Property Broker: Who, What & How, 48 I.C.C. PRAc. J. 441, 442-43 (May-
June 1981).
25 Senn Trucking Co., 1986 MCC LEXIS at *10.
26 1987 Hearing, supra note 11, at 13.
27 Michael L Crum, et al., Motor Freight Transport Third Party Service: Shipper and Carrier
Perspectives, 60 TRAisP. PRAC. 3. 37, 56 (Fall 1992).
28 BROWN, supra note 5, at 14.
29 Fuerst, supra note 9, at 46 ("The broker middleman is an agent for the carrier and secures
service on behalf of the shipper. His role is similar to that of sales agents, manufacturing reps,
and brokers active in other industries; he sells the use of the carrier's equipment in the transpor-
tation of property.")
30 Fuerst, supra note 9, at 46.
31 Fuerst, supra note 9, at 46.
32 Depending upon the particular fleet, trucks travel empty up to 50% of the time. 1987
Hearing, supra note 11, at 52.
33 Tom Bassing, Transportation Brokerage Can Be a Dirty Job, So Curry Does it Right, 10
KAN. Crry Bus. J., Oct. 25, 1991, at 4 ("XYZ Inc. might have customers in an out-of-the-way
burg. They have their own trucks, getting there is no problem. But they face the prospect of
returning empty. A brokerage is called to find a revenue-bearing load for the so-called
backhaul.")
34 Terrance A. Brown, Property Brokers: A Pilot Study of Carriers' Perspectives, 30 TRANsP.
J. 32, 37 (Winter 1990).
35 Id. at 35.
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additional tool for obtaining responsible transportation services for
reasonable prices.3 6 A broker can save shippers the headache of deal-
ing with a myriad of small carriers, 37 and depending on the destination
of the goods, brokers can usually save shippers money.38 This is espe-
cially true for small shippers who do not have large traffic depart-
ments and who are unfamiliar with the transportation industry.39
Brokers also perform services for overseas companies who trans-
port freight to and from the United States. Working in conjunction
with freight forwarders and other international intermediaries, freight
brokers often arrange for overseas cargo to be moved by motor car-
rier once it arrives at domestic sea ports and airports. Freight brokers
thus play a vital role in international, as well as interstate, commerce.
Even though the term "brokerage service" is defined by regula-
tion,4 ° persons involved in the transportation industry have difficulty
understanding a broker's functions.4' The current atmosphere en-
courages the growth of brokers, but leaves their activities uncertain.42
The reasons for this uncertainty are twofold. First, the principal-agent
relationship of brokers is unclear. Some brokers perceive themselves
as agents of the carrier,4 3 while others believe they are agents of the
shipper.44 In a way, both are right.45 In each specific transaction, a
broker is in a sense an agent of both the shipper and carrier.46 None-
theless, the law is well-settled that a broker is an independent inter-
36 Id. at 35.
37 Terrance A. Brown, Property Brokers: A Pilot Study of Shipper Perspectives, 31 TRANSl. J.
45, 48 (Fall 1991) ("From the respondents' comments it appears that nine used brokers primarily
because of lower prices, eleven for service reasons, and five for both reasons.")
38 Dinell, supra note 22, at'll.
39 Dinell, supra note 22, at 11.
40 49 C.F.R. § 1045.2(c) (1992); the term "non-brokerage" service is defined as "all other
service performed by a broker on behalf of a motor carrier, consignor, or consignee." 49 C.F.R.
§ 1045.2(d) (1992).
41 MARTELL, supra note 5, at I ("The problem may be due to the fact that the transportation
broker's authority and status arises from statutes, regulations, and judicial concepts embedded in
many proceedings over a long period.")
42 MARTELL, supra note 5, at 144.
43 Terrance A. Brown, Freight Brokers and General Commodity Trucking, 24 TRAisp. J. 4,
12 (Winter 1984).
44 SAUL SORKiN, 2 GooDs iN TRANsrr § 14.13[2] (1993) (brokerage services can be per-
formed on behalf of a motor carrier, shipper or consignee, but a broker generally acts on behalf
of the shipper).
45 Prior to deregulation, the ICC viewed the party making the first request for transportation
as receiving the full benefit of the broker's service. Thus, if a shipper requested that a broker
arrange transportation, the shipper was the broker's principal. The ICC has since changed its
position on this issue. 45 Fed. Reg. 31140 (1980) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. § 1045 (1980)).
46 MARTELL, supra note 5, at 2.
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mediary who does not act on behalf of either the shipper or carrier.47
ICC decisions stress that a broker is only an arranger of transportation
acting in an advisory nature and is independent of both carriers and
shippers.48
The second reason for the uncertainty of a broker's role in inter-
state commerce is that there are a number of different types of trans-
portation intermediaries who perform services similar to those
performed by freight brokers.49 The most similar is the freight for-
warder.50 Freight forwarders are transport intermediaries that utilize
both rail and motor carriage.5' A freight forwarder is best described
as being a carrier to a shipper and a shipper to a carrier.52 Unlike
brokers, freight forwarders issue bills of lading in their own names and
assume cargo loss and damage liability.53 The work performed by
shipper's agents also resembles that done by brokers. Shipper's
agents are unregulated intermediaries who arrange rail-piggyback ser-
vice on behalf of shippers.54 Due to the quasi-regulated nature of the
47 P.D. Copes Broker Application, 27 M.C.C. 153, 157-58 (1940) (quoting Cain Broker Ap-
plication, 2 M.C.C. 633, 635-36 (1937)).
48 Dal-Tile Corp. and Red Arrow Freight Lines, Inc., Petition for Declaratory Order, No.
40437, 1990 I.C.C. LEXIS 350, at *4 (1990) (the very nature of brokerage is that it is performed
jointly for the benefit of both shipper and carrier).
49 Tom Andel, Don't Gamble with Brokers, 32 TiAsp. & DIsRmiBTnoN, Aug. 1991, at 24
("Deregulation made the roles and responsibilities under the law much more confusing for
shippers.").
50 Freight forwarders were deregulated under the Surface Freight Forwarders Deregulation
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-521, 100 Stat. 2993 (1986).
51 A freight forwarder is defined as:
a person holding itself out to the general public (other than as an express, pipeline, rail,
sleeping car, motor or water carrier) to provide transportation of property for compensation
and in the ordinary course of its business:
(A) assembles and consolidates, or provides for assembling and consolidating,
shipments and performs or provides for break-bulk and distribution operations of the
shipments;
(B) assumes responsibility for the transportation from place of receipt to place
of destination; and
(C) uses for any part of the transportation a carrier ....
49 U.S.C. § 10102(9) (Supp. 1992).
52 See BROWN, supra note 5, at 18 (the obligations and responsibilities of the shipper and the
carrier apply to a freight forwarder, principal of which is payment of freight charges and fees, as
well as payment of cargo loss and damage claims).
53 BROWN, supra note 5, at 18-19.
54 BROWN, supra note 5, at 7-8. Shipper's agents provide the following services:
(1) Make all transport arrangements, including all rail and motor carriage and trailer
leasing.
(2) Provide the shipper with one bill for the entire move instead of several bills from sev-
eral carriers.
(3) Accomplish the move with expertise and knowledge of current market conditions.
BROWN, supra note 5, at 8. Shipper's agents, however, do not assume liability for lost or dam-
aged cargo.
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transportation industry, there is no clear distinction between the du-
ties and responsibilities of freight forwarders, shipper's agents and
freight brokers; the work performed by each often overlaps with the
others. This is especially true when a single entity holds itself out as
more than one type of transportation intermediary.55 Unfortunately,
litigation is often necessary to determine the status of a particular
intermediary.56
Although freight brokers have existed since the 1920s, the vast
majority of currently licensed brokers are new to the business. As of
1975, there were only seventy property broker licenses in existence.58
Of those holding licenses, as few as five were active in the brokerage
industry.59 As a result of deregulation, the brokerage industry grew
by leaps and bounds between 1978 and 1992.60 By 1992 there were
11,000 licensed brokers, of which an estimated 7,000 were active.6'
The number of brokers is estimated to exceed 15,000 by 1994,62 but it
is difficult to make accurate estimates given the high level of attrition
in the industry.63
Most freight brokers are small independently-owned companies
that market trucking services to local shippers.' Nonetheless, brokers
generally have authority to arrange transportation anywhere in the
55 See Stachura, supra note 3, at 3 (it is appropriate for a broker to act as a freight forwarder
and a shipper's agent).
56 See, e.g., Dal-Tile Corp. and Red Arrow Freight Lines, Inc., 1990 I.C.C. LEXIS 350, at *6
(court asked to determine whether party was a broker, shipper's agent or freight forwarder).
Most of this litigation can be avoided by requiring freight brokers to maintain the same level of
liability insurance as freight forwarders.
57 Fifty-nine percent of all brokers have been in business less than seven years. Dinell, supra
note 22, at 11.
58 Brown, supra note 43, at 6 (this number included household goods brokers and many
inactive freight brokers).
59 BRowN, supra note 5, at 64.
60 During this same period, the number of motor carriers tripled from 12,900 in 1978 to
39,000 in 1992. BRowN, supra note 5, at 9.
61 Crum, supra note 27, at 39. Approximately 1,000 licensed brokers are members of the
Transportation Brokers Conference of America, the freight brokers' lobbying association.
Dinell, supra note 22, at 11.
62 Fuerst, supra note 9, at 46.
63 During a five-week period in 1987,200 new brokers were added to the rolls and 189 were
deleted. This amounts to an annual turnover rate of 33%. 1987 Hearing, supra note 11, at 17.
There is a dispute over whether the brokerage industry will continue to expand. Compare Prop-
erty Broker Practices, 132 M.C.C. 233 (1980), and Crum, supra note 27, at 52-53.
64 Brown, supra note 37 at 45. Sixty percent of brokers are independently owned; most of
the rest are departments or subsidiaries of motor carriers. See also Terrance A. Brown, Size and
Operating Characteristics of Property Brokers, 29 TRANSP. .52,55 (Summer 1990). As many as
50% of carriers and 12% of shippers operate as freight brokers. Crum, supra note 27, at 51.
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forty-eight contiguous states.6" A large broker may deal with more
than 500 carriers and 150 domestic and international shippers.66 Ship-
pers who use brokers tend to be small manufacturers employing fewer
than 100 workers.67 The primary reason shippers hire brokers is to
obtain lower prices, although many shippers utilize brokers for service
reasons.68  Nearly sixty percent of carriers and forty-five percent of
shippers utilize brokerage services.69
Most brokerage service is arranged by telephone, with the parties
rarely meeting face-to-face.70 Shippers place transportation orders
with brokers, who in turn telephone carriers to arrange for the actual
pickup and delivery of the shipper's freight.7 Once the freight is de-
livered, the broker bills the shipper and the shipper sends payment
directly to the broker. The broker then remits a portion of this pay-
ment to the transporting carrier.72 The broker typically keeps be-
tween ten and fifteen percent of the charges as its commission.73 A
broker may charge any price it can obtain for its service and may
change prices without notice; unlike common carriers, brokers are not
required to file their rates with the ICC.74
A reputable brokerage industry would have unlimited potential
in the transportation industry. Unfortunately, it is all too easy for
crooked or seriously undercapitalized intermediaries to take advan-
tage of the current deregulated marketplace to the detriment of carri-
65 Acceptable Forms of Requests for Operating Authority (Motor Carriers and Brokers of
Property), 364 I.C.C. 432,454 (1980) (The proper description of brokerage authority for purpose
of a broker application is: "To operate, in interstate and foreign commerce, as a broker of gen-
eral commodities (except household goods), between points in the United States.")
66 Bassing, supra note 33, at 4.
67 Brown, supra note 37, at 46. The typical shipper who utilizes brokerage services ships
between two and 20 truckloads per week of products such as paper, chemicals, petroleum, plas-
tics, rubber, food and tobacco. Brown, supra note 34, at 33.
68 Brown, supra note 37, at 48 (for large shippers, service is more important than lower
prices).
69 Crum, supra note 27, at 44-45 (in 1980, 119 of the 266 motor carrier respondents reported
using external third parties; this number increased to 152 of 266 by 1989).
70 Johanson Transportation Service, Petition for Declaratory Order, No. MC-C-30079, 1988
I.C.C. LEXIS 298, at *8 (1988).
71 The broker may be known to the shipper, but the trucker who shows up at the dock to
pick up the freight may be a total stranger. Fritz Kahn, Get It in Writing; Contract Between
Shipper and Freight Broker, DISRIBUrION, Sep. 1991, at 71.
72 See, eg., Andel, supra note 49, at 26:
73 Dinell, supra note 22, at 11 (broker's usual commission is 12 or 13%).
74 Brown, supra note 43, at 10 ("In contrast, common carriers must file rates with the ICC
and cannot change them instantaneously and without cost. Thus, price flexibility is an advantage
brokers can sometimes have in comparison to regulated common carriers.")
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ers, shippers and honest brokers.75 Brokers, as a whole, remain a
shadowy element in the transportation sector.76 There must be laws in
the marketplace to establish the stability necessary for competition to
be fostered and encouraged.
III. EvoLUTIoN oF BROKERAGE REGULATION
Federal regulation of brokers has come full circle in the last sixty
years. In the 1920s, freight brokers engaged in business virtually free
of federal regulation. Between 1935 and 1980, brokers were heavily
regulated by the ICC. Since 1980, brokers have been virtually free,
once again, of federal regulation.77
Brokerage early became an incident of motor transportation, as
described in P.D. Copes Broker Application:
78
the vast majority of motor carriers of freight are small operators with
only a few pieces of equipment and neither a need for nor means to
support a large organization including salaried solicitors.... Neverthe-
less, economy and efficiency of operation require that they have some
means of obtaining at points away from their home bases either return
loads or lading for some other point.
Out of this situation there grew up, long prior to the adoption of the
Motor Carrier Act, 1935,... agencies independent of both carriers and
shippers, devoted to the solicitation of traffic to be moved by carriers
selected by them from whom they exacted a charge for their services....
In theory, the system was designed to work not only to the convenience
of the carriers, but also to that of shippers and passengers, many of
whom were not sufficiently informed or situated so that they could read-
ily locate available motor-carrier service when desired, but the resulting
dependence of both carriers and shippers or passengers on these in-
dependent transportation agents gave rise to abuses. Irresponsible per-
sons exacted excessive charges for their services or engaged the services
of unreliable and unqualified carriers, or both. Available traffic was held
out to competing carriers, and the bids of each were used to beat down
the price of others until all were reduced to a bare subsistence basis, and
unconscionable commissions were obtained by the brokers.
79
75 1987 Hearing, supra note 11, at 24-30 (in one case, a broker filed bankruptcy listing 133
carriers as creditors for a total of more than $300,000).
76 Joseph V. Barks, Brokers Close In, DsrMauBro N, Nov. 1984, at 48-49 (victims of broker
abuse "from both the carrier and shipper sides are also quick to relate grisly details about de-
mands for large cash advances, incidents of false or deceptive representation, subversive
schemes, take-the-money-and-run scams, smash-the-freight-and-hide stunts, and other sordid
crimes").
77 See generally, Samuel P. Delisi, Interstate Commerce Commission Regulation, 1887-1987
The Carrier Viewpoint, 54 T~RAsP. PRc. J. 262 (1987).
78 27 M.C.C. 153 (1940).




In the 1920s, brokers were unregulated on the federal level."0
Regulatory control of interstate commerce rested with the states.
Brokers operating in different states had to obtain authority from
each jurisdiction through which they passed."' The state regulations
covered a variety of fields, including the grant of operating certifi-
cates, the regulation of rates and the prescription of compulsory
insurance.82
On March 2, 1925, the Supreme Court handed down its decision
in Buck v. Kuykendall s in which it held that states may not restrict
the operations of motor vehicles engaged in interstate commerce un-
less the state regulation was aimed primarily at assuring safety or con-
servation of highways. As a result of this decision, there was no
economic regulation of interstate motor carriers and brokers, either
state or federal, for the next ten years, but the forces which would
shape the 1935 Act were already in place.84
A. Motor Carrier Act of 1935
After Buck, Congressional attention was focused on the problem
of motor carrier regulation. From 1925 to 1934, thirty-one bills were
introduced in Congress seeking federal regulation of motor transpor-
tation. 5 It was widely believed that unrestrained competition was not
the solution to the ills of the transportation industry.86 The public
sentiment favored federal regulation of interstate commerceY
Not infrequently, shippers patronizing brokers in the early 1930s
were subjected to great inconvenience or substantial losses, without
80 Brown, supra note 43, at 5-7. Prior to the enactment of the 1935 Act, the ICC adminis-
tered steam railroads, electric railways, express companies, sleeping car companies, pipelines and
steamship companies.
81 William E. Thorns, Rollin' On To A Free Market Motor Carrier Regulation 1935-1980, 13
TRANSP. L. J. 43, 47 (1983) (to this date, carriers must still obtain license plates from each state
through which they pass).
82 Coordination of Motor Transportation, 182 I.C.C. 263, 371 (1932). The states also regu-
lated safety devices, size, weight and speed of vehicles, and the prescription of uniform account-
ing procedures. The gradual improvement in the conditions of motor carriers in the early 1930s
is attributed to comprehensive state regulations. S. Rep. 152, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1934).
83 267 U.S. 307 (1925) (court struck down a Washington law which required motor carriers to
obtain certificates declaring that the public convenience and necessity required their services).
84 George M. Chandler, Convenience and Necessity: Motor Carrier Licensing by the Inter-
state Commerce Commission, 28 OHiO ST. LJ. 379, 380 (1967) (the year after Buck, the ICC
instituted an investigation into the possibilities of regulating interstate motor transportation; its
conclusion was that while regulation was probably in the public interest, the primary responsibil-
ity should be turned back over to the states).
85 S. Rep. 641, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1980).
86 Coordination of Motor ransportation, 182 I.C.C. 263, 380 (1932).
87 Id.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 14:289 (1994)
recourse against the brokers.' Long hours, unsafe operations and
low earnings of motor carriers were attributed to unregulated bro-
kers.8 9 These conditions precipitated the passage of the 1935 Act.
A series of reports from the Commerce Commission and the Fed-
eral Coordinator of Transportation preceded the regulation of freight
brokers. The first report called "for the issuance of brokerage permits
to insure responsibility of transportation agents or brokers and to
lessen the present evils of brokerage in transportation." 90 In the sec-
ond report to Congress, the Coordinator proposed "more thorough-
going regulation of brokers or transportation agents."91 To avoid con-
fusion, this report used the term "licenses" instead of "permits." 92
Licenses would be required of all persons "making contracts, agree-
ments, or arrangements to provide transportation of persons or prop-
erty in interstate or foreign commerce."'93 A showing of public
interest and financial responsibility was a condition to the issuance of
a license. 94
The purpose of Congress in regulating freight brokers was to pro-
tect carriers and the shipping public from dishonest and financially
unsound middlemen. 95 To this end, section 211(c) of the 1935 Act
directed the ICC to prescribe rules and regulations for the protection
of the public to be observed by anyone holding a broker's license.96
The ICC was authorized to establish reasonable requirements with re-
spect to licensing, financial responsibility, accounts, records, reports,
operations, and practices of brokers.97
As for entry into the brokerage market, § 211 of the 1935 Act, in
essence, provided:
no person shall engage in operation as a broker of motor transportation
of passengers or property unless it has first established that its proposed
service is or will be consistent with the public interest and the national
88 Practices of Property Brokers, 49 M.C.C. 277,279 (1949) (often the carrier is merely a
dupe of the transportation agent who supplies it with business, takes a disproportionate share of
the rate, and repossesses the carrier's equipment upon the carrier's failure to meet payments or
its refusal to handle further shipments).
89 P.D. Copes Broker Application, 27 M.C.C. 153,157 (1940).
90 S. Rep. 152, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1934).




95 Milan Express Co. v. Western Sur. Co., 792 F. Supp. 571, 574 (M.D. Tenn. 1992) (motor
carriers are entitled to proceeds of broker's surety bond).
96 1935 Act § 221(c).




transportation policy and has obtained a broker's license authorizing
such service.
98
The ICC interpreted this statute as requiring issuance of a bro-
ker's license to any applicant who convincingly demonstrates (1) that
it is fit, willing and able to properly perform the proposed service and
to conform to governing statutes and regulations; and (2) that the pro-
posed service is or will be consistent with the public interest and the
national transportation policy.99 An applicant seeking authority had
to show that its services would fulfill a useful public function and
would contribute something of value to the shipping public.1' °
The "fitness" portion of this standard involved four factors: good
general character, an ability to conduct the proposed operations in a
manner satisfactory to patrons, willingness to comply with regulatory
requirements, and the ability to obtain the required bond.10 The
"public interest" aspect of § 211(b) encompassed a broader range of
deliberation than did the "fitness" standard. The applicant was re-
quired to prove that its proposed operations would not needlessly du-
plicate existing services. 02 Consideration of existing brokerage
service was relevant to brokerage applications for it was obvious that
the creation of needlessly duplicative services is not in the public in-
terest.10 3 In fact, as early as 1938, the ICC denied a brokerage appli-
cation because of possible adverse affects on existing service, even
though the application was unopposed."° As of November 30, 1946,
the ICC had issued 154 broker licenses and denied approximately 700
applications.0 5 Of those issued, twenty-one were to freight
brokers. 1°6
98 Entry Control of Brokers, 126 M.C.C. 476, 479 (1977), vacated and remanded, 591 F.2d 896
(D.C. Cir. 1978). Entry of brokers under § 211(b), where the governing test is consistency with
public convenience and necessity, is not as stringent as the public convenience and necessity
criteria applied in motor carrier applications pursuant to § 207 of the 1935 Act. Paul S. Demp-
sey, Entry Control Under The Interstate Commerce Act A Comparative Analysis Of The Statu-
tory Criteria Governing Entry In Transportation, 13 WAKE FoREST. L. REv. 729, 770 (1977).
99 Dempsey, supra note 98, at 761-62.
100 Dempsey, supra note 98, at 762.
101 Entry Control of Brokers, 126 M.C.C. at 485-86 (the requirement that a broker furnish a
$5,000 security bond was designed to ensure the broker's continuing financial ability to operate).
102 Id. at 484. Normally, the applicant was required to make such a showing through testi-
mony of potential shippers and carriers, although it was theoretically possible to make such a
showing based on a convincing plan of future operations. Id. at 484.
103 Id. at 483-84.
104 See Interstate Ticket Sales, Inc., Broker Application, 8 M.C.C. 483 (1938).
105 Practices of Property Brokers, 49 M.C.C. 277, 280-81 (1949).
106 Id. (approximately 80 of the licenses were issued to brokers of property, and of this
number 21 were issued to brokers of general commodities; the balance were issued to special
commodity brokers and brokers of household goods).
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Following the passage of the 1935 Act, the ICC moved slowly to
adopt broker regulations. In 1936, the ICC mandated that all brokers
secure a $5,000 surety bond before being issued a license.107 In 1942,
the ICC prescribed rules requiring brokers to maintain certain
records.08 Seven years later, the ICC enacted a comprehensive set of
regulations governing the practices of freight brokers.1 9 These regu-
lations defined the terms "brokers" and "brokerage services"; re-
quired the maintenance of certain brokerage records;110 required
brokers to utilize the services of licensed carriers; and prohibited bro-
kers from collecting rebates."'
The 1935 Act made entry into the market not only difficult, but
expensive.1 12 Those who acquired licenses, however, prospered dur-
ing this period. 13 Between 1935 and the late 1970s, brokers were pro-
tected from the forces of competition that virtually every other
business had to deal with on a daily basis." 4 All this was to change in
the late 1970s, first by administrative action and then by legislation.
B. Administrative Deregulation
During the late 1970s, deregulation embraced a multitude of di-
verse industries, including airlines, railroads, bus companies, telecom-
munications, broadcasting, banking, cable television, oil and gas,
pipelines and motor carriers." 5 The Airline Deregulation Act," 6 for
example, completely deregulated the air transportation industry.
117
107 Motor Carrier Ins. for Protection of the Public, 1 M.C.C. 45, 59 (1936) (no one at the
hearing objected to this amount).
108 Records of Passenger Brokers, 32 M.C.C. 267, 268 (1942) (passenger brokers).
109 Practices of Property Brokers, 49 M.C.C. 277 (1949). The rules considered in this opinion
were slightly modified in 1951. See Practices of Property Brokers, 53 M.C.C. 633 (1951).
110 The primary purpose of the record keeping requirements was to ascertain whether im-
proper rebating activities were taking place. 45 Fed. Reg. 31, 140 (1980) (to be codified at 49
C.F.R. pt. 1045) (proposed May 12, 1980).
111 Practices of Property Brokers, 49 M.C.C. at 286-328. The ICC refused, however, to adopt
rules limiting the amount of fees a broker could charge for its services. Il- at 308-18.
112 1987 Hearing, supra note 11, at 34.
113 H. Rep. 1069, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980) ("the motor carrier of property industry for all
intents and purposes is a healthy industry that effectively competed with other freight-hauling
modes"); Cong. Rec. 7767,7777 (Daily ed. Apr. 15, 1980) (statement of Sen. Cannon) (reporting
that the motor carrier industry of the late 1970s was financially sound).
114 J&
115 See generally, Paul S. Dempsey, Interstate Trucking: The Collision of Textbook Theory and
Empirical Reality, 20 TRANSP. L. J. 185, 186 (1992).
116 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. Law 95-504, [Federal Laws], 92 Stat. 1705
(1978).
117 Thoms, supra note 81, at 69. ("By 1978, Americans had an example of deregulation. The
Air Cargo Deregulation Act and the Airline Deregulation Act had been passed, thus creating a
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During this same period, economists persuaded Presidents Carter and
Reagan to appoint conservatives to the ICC, who in turn began a
defacto deregulation of the motor transportation industry.118 Both
Presidents believed that four decades of federal regulation had im-
peded the operating efficiency of motor carriers and brokers, resulting
in inadequate service and higher costs. 19
Even before the enactment of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, the
ICC began to remove entry barriers into the brokerage market by
granting brokerage authority on a fitness only test.' 20 The Commis-
sion determined that there was no compelling reason to require each
brokerage applicant to establish that its proposed service would be
consistent with the public interest and the national transportation pol-
icy, so the Commission made a general finding that all brokerage op-
erations were consistent with the public interest and the national
transportation policy.' 21 After this point, protests to brokerage appli-
cations were limited to matters pertaining to the applicant's fitness.' 22
Harm to existing brokers was no longer sufficient to block the issu-
ance of a broker's license; opponents were required to show that the
proposed service would be injurious to the public as a whole.
123
The arguments advanced in favor of eased entry controls
included:
(1) smaller carriers would be able to compete more effectively with
larger carriers if entry control were eased, (2) only bonding and record
maintenance requirements seem necessary, (3)... (4) for the smaller
business, the cost of obtaining a broker license is prohibitively expen-
sive, (5) the chances of success in obtaining a broker license, when
weighed with the high cost, deter broker applications, [and] (5) present
licenses are now too restrictive in the geographical scope....
The Commission also determined that there was no longer any
need to impose commodity or territorial limitations on brokerage ap-
sunset law for the CAB. Although there have been many adverse effects on price and service
since the passage of these laws, there were enough one-shot benefits with innovative fares by
airlines entering new markets to make the idea of deregulation palatable to customers.") See
also Beth S. Adler, Comment, Deregulation in the Airline Industry: Toward a New Judicial Inter-
pretation of the Railway Labor Act, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 1003 (1986).
118 Dempsey, supra note 115, at 187.
119 40 Cong. Q. 335 (Feb. 20, 1982).
120 Entry Control of Brokers, 126 M.C.C. 476, 485-86 (1977). It was within the ICC's author-
ity to adopt a general finding that the public interest was served by the licensing of "fit" brokers.
National Tour Brokers Ass'n v. I.C.C., 671 F.2d 528, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
121 Entry Control of Brokers, 126 M.C.C. at 478 & 525.
122 Entry Control of Brokers, 126 M.C.C. at 525.
123 Thorns, supra note 81, at 74.
124 Entry Control of Brokers, 126 M.C.C. at 486.
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plicants, since the focus of the application process was on the appli-
cant's fitness and not existing competition. 25 In exchange for easier
entry, the ICC increased the broker's security bond requirement from
$5,000 to $10,000..26 In 1980, the ICC revised the regulations gov-
erning brokers to reflect its new entry controls.1 27
Opponents of eased entry controls claimed that the ICC had
bowed to deregulation pressures, attempting to quiet critics by der-
egulating a small segment of the motor transportation industry in the
belief that this would show internal reform, without upsetting the en-
tire industry.' 28 They argued that if unchecked, brokers would exploit
small shippers and carriers for the sake of profit alone, at the expense
of efficient transportation service.129 These warnings went unheeded
by the ICC.
The open entry policy adopted by the ICC led to a large increase
in the size of the freight brokerage industry. 3 By 1979, the ICC was
granting nearly ninety-eight percent of applications. 3' The ICC's
defacto deregulation served as a prelude to the Motor Carrier Act of
1980.
C. Motor Carrier Act of 1980
There was an increasing pressure in the late 1970s, at both the
state and federal levels, to reduce government involvement in the pri-
vate sector. Over the years, the federal government had become in-
creasingly involved in the management of the nation's transportation
system. 32 Congress had built a patchwork of economic regulation
125 Entry Control of Brokers, 126 M.C.C. at 513-14.
126 Entry Control of Brokers, 126 M.C.C. at 526.
127 49 C.F.R. pts. 1043-45 (1980). The regulations adopted in 1980 included bonding require-
ments; definitions of the terms "broker," "bona fide agents," "brokerage service," and "non-
brokerage service"; record maintenance requirements; prohibition against representing brokers
as carriers; ban on receiving rebates; outline of the duties and obligations of brokers; and
mandatory accounting procedures.
128 Entry Control of Brokers, 126 M.C.C. at 490 (one respondent cautioned that eased entry
control might mislead the public into thinking that every ICC-licensed individual was a reliable
broker).
129 Entry Control of Brokers, 126 M.C.C. at 490-91.
130 Brown, supra note 43, at 6.
131 Dempsey, supra note 17, at 4. Most applicants escaped serious scrutiny. For example, the
ICC issued operating authority to a convicted felon. See Wilkett v. I.C.C., 710 F.2d 861, 862
(D.C. Cir. 1983).
132 President's Message to Congress Transmitting Motor Carrier Reform Act, H.R. Rep. No.
307, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1975). The portion of the motor carrier industry subject to federal
regulation in 1979 was composed of 17,000 trucking firms that generated about $41.2 billion in
transportation revenues. Regulated carriers, however, comprised less than 50% of the market.




that had stifled a naturally competitive industry. 33 The trucking in-
dustry had changed dramatically since 1935, but federal regulation
had remained static.lM The general consensus in Congress was that a
competitive marketplace could serve the needs of interstate com-
merce better than a few bureaucrats in Washington. 135 Supporters of
deregulation argued that it was impossible for any agency, no matter
how wise and benevolent, to apply a 1935 statute to 1980 transporta-
tion problems. 36
The Motor Carrier Act of 1980 established as federal policy the
promotion of competition and efficiency among carriers and brokers
of property in order to achieve certain goals.137 Those goals included
meeting the needs of shippers, consignees and consumers; allowing
price flexibility; encouraging greater efficiency, particularly in the use
of fuel; providing better service to small communities; and opening
the market to minority groups.' 3 The purposes of the Act were to
reduce unnecessary federal regulation,'
139 encourage competition,'140
and overhaul the outmoded and archaic regulatory scheme imposed in
1935.4
Technically, the 1980 Act did not deregulate the trucking indus-
try, but re-regulated it.142 It represented a sort of middleground be-
tween continuing the regulation of the previous 45 years, on the one
133 H. Rep. 1069, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. at 2-6. For instance, the ICC had 36 categories of
exempt and non-exempt products listed under the heading of milk and cream. Buttermilk was
exempt from regulation, but butterfat and buttermilk with condensed cream were regulated.
Constituted skim milk and powdered milk were exempt, but condensed milk and evaporated
milk were not. Thorns, supra note 81, at 69.
134 President's Message to Congress Transmitting Trucking Competition and Safety Act of
1979, H.R. Rep. No. 155, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1979).
135 Cong. Rec. 7767,7777 (daily ed. Apr. 15,1980) (statement of Sen. Cannon); 24 TRANsP. &
DlsrRmrIoN 21 (May 1983).
136 Cong. Rec. 7767, 7777 (daily ed. Apr. 15, 1980) (statement of Sen. Cannon). Opponents
of deregulation countered with the argument that Congress was discarding a rich background of
knowledge and experience on the basis of highly partial evaluations of deregulation. S. Rep.
641, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1980).
137 Acceptable Forms of Requests for Operating Authority (Motor Carriers and Brokers of
Property), 364 I.C.C. 432, 434 (1980). The 1980 Act was the product of over 18 months of con-
tinuous study in which 16 days of hearings were conducted and 215 witnesses testified. See H.
Rep. 1069, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980).
138 H. Rep. 1069, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. at 3 ("The bill offers increased opportunities for new
carriers to get into the trucking business and for existing carriers to expand their services.").
139 H. Rep. 1069, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. at 3.
140 Stephen J. Wallis Broker Application, No. MC-254878, 1992 M.C.C. LEXIS 159, at *3
(I.C.C. Oct. 29, 1992).
141 H. Rep. 1069, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. at 6-7.
142 See generally Lloyd N. Cutler, Regulatory Mismatch and Its Cure, 96 HARv. L. REv. 545
(1982) (reviewing Stephen Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform, (1982)).
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hand, and total deregulation, on the other hand. 43 Because the truck-
ing industry fought deregulation so bitterly, the final version of the
1980 Act was considerably softened.1" There remained a greater de-
gree of regulation over trucking than existed for any industry of com-
parable size.' 45
In a practical sense, however, the brokerage industry was com-
pletely deregulated. The 1980 Act codified the relaxed entry controls
that the ICC had formulated in 1978.146 The ease of entry, coupled
with the Commission's laissez-faire policies, caused many brokerage
applicants to escape serious scrutiny. 47 Posting a $10,000 bond and
securing service agents'" are the only remaining prerequisites to ac-
quiring a brokerage license.'
49
During the 1980s, the ICC became a politically administered
agency bent on promoting free enterprise. 50 Despite strong warnings
from Congress and the courts, the Commission has repeatedly disre-
garded the few brokerage laws still on the books after the 1980 Act. 51
With the support of the White House, the ICC continued its program
of administrative deregulation throughout the 1980s.' 52
143 S. Rep. 641, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980). One of the principal purposes of the 1980 Act
was to curtail the ICC's runaway deregulation. Dempsey, supra note 17, at 5 ("The Constitution
confers on Congress, not the ICC, the power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce.")
144 Florida's Test of Truck Deregulation, BUSINESS WEEK, Sep. 22, 1980, at 125.
145 President's Message to Congress Transmitting Trucking Competition and Safety Act of
1979, H.R. Doc. No. 155, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1979). One commentator cynically summed up
the federal government's ever-changing regulatory policy as follows: "There will always be regu-
lation - perhaps not as we have known it in the past in the transportation industry, but in some
form. Regulation is hidden in every legislation designed to cancel some regulatory item. It's like
a pancake - you flip it over, and it's still a pancake." MARTELL, supra note 5, at 21.
146 See generally Thoms, supra note 81, at 73-75. Section 10924 of the 1980 Act eliminated the
requirement that the ICC find that an applicant's proposed service is consistent with the public
interest and the national transportation policy. The ICC must determine only that the applicant
is fit, willing and able.
147 Thoms, supra note 81, at 73-75. All third party operators are, for the most part, unregu-
lated today. The ICC continues to issue licenses to brokers, but certification is merely a formal-
ity. Crum, supra note 27, at 38-39. There are essentially no natural or institutional barriers to
entry. Thoms, supra note 81, at 73-75.
148 A broker must, after approval and before operations, file with the ICC a list of service
agents in the 48 contiguous states. MARTELL, supra note 5, at 34. A broker may appoint a
state's secretary of state as its service agent, but this will subject the broker to personal jurisdic-
tion in that state. Ocepek v. Corporate Transport, Inc., 950 F.2d 556 (8th Cir. 1991).
149 See generally, 49 C.F.R. pts. 1043-45 (1992). Applicants must also pay $150 fee for a bro-
kerage license. See Regulations Governing Fees for Services in Connection with Licensing, 1
I.C.C.2d 60 (1984).
150 1987 Hearing, supra note 11, at 42 (statement Senator Exon).
151 Dempsey, supra note 17, at 50.
152 Dempsey, supra note 17, at 10. Some members of Congress thought the ICC was moving
too slowly in deregulating the motor transportation industry. 40 CONG. Q. 335 (Feb. 20, 1982).
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In 1935, Congress regulated brokers in an effort to curtail compe-
tition. Forty-five years later, Congress repealed a large part of the
1935 Act hoping, ironically, to promote competition. While the 1935
Act stifled the brokerage industry's growth, the 1980 Act created ex-
cessive capacity, declining productivity, destructive competition and
an increased number of bankruptcies. 5 3 The brokerage industry has
progressively suffered every year since 1978.54 Transportation costs,
which were predicted to decrease with deregulation, have increased at
alarming rates.15
In the last ten years, a number of bills have been introduced in
Congress to sunset the ICC and thereby completely deregulate bro-
kers." 6 None of these bills has succeeded, and rightfully so.157 The
brokerage industry has suffered enough under deregulation. It is time
to stop the bleeding. This does not mean that Congress should return
to the stifling regulations of 1935. Rather, the solution is for Congress
to enact a comprehensive set of regulations like those proposed in this
article.
D. Intrastate Regulation
If a freight broker wishes to broker freight intrastate, it must
comply with the regulations of that state. Not all states regulate bro-
kers; therefore, a broker must check the laws of the states in which it
transports freight.158 As of 1992, fifteen states regulated the intrastate
operations of brokers.15 9 Although not uniform, the state regulations
typically require brokers to obtain licenses, post bonds, and in some
instances, maintain liability insurance.160
153 See Dempsey, supra note 115, at 188 ("The free market had produced the worst economic
collapse in history, and millions of Americans lost their jobs, their homes, their self esteem, and
their faith in the philosophy of laissez faire.").
154 Dempsey, supra note 115, at 193.
155 Dempsey, supra note 115, at 191-93.
156 See, eg., James E. Bartley, Cooperation and Advocacy Rule, 32 TRANsP. & DISTBUTION,
Apr. 1991, at 10.
157 Some commentators have noted that fly-by-night brokers will be in the "catbird seat" if
the ICC is dissolved. See, ag., Russ, supra note 8, at 30.
158 MARTELL, supra note 5, at 8.
159 See State Motor Carrier Guide (CCII) (1992). The states that regulate freight brokers are
Alabama, Arkansas, California, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia and Washington.
160 See, eg., TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 911f §§ 4,5,8,12 (1993).
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IV. THE BROKERAGE INDUSTRY'S PROBLEMS
Prior to deregulation, the brokerage industry was trustworthy and
reliable. Admittedly, this reputation may have resulted from the fact
that there were less than a dozen brokers in existence during this pe-
riod. Deregulation, however, has changed the public's image of
freight brokers. There is now a black cloud hanging over the broker-
age industry.161 Carriers and shippers, who once trusted brokers with-
out a second-thought, now consider it a "gamble" to deal with
brokers. 162 One commentator summed up the disdain for brokers by
reporting that transportation people no longer tell horror stories, they
now tell broker stories. 63 The reputation of brokers has declined so
far that brokerage industry leaders now suggest that brokers refrain
from using the word "broker" in their business names.164
Broker abuse costs motor carriers and shippers thousands of dol-
lars each year and has driven several firms into bankruptcy. 65 During
1987, the ICC received 610 broker complaints, most of which con-
cerned the failure of brokers to remit freight charges. 66 One carrier
reported a $100,000 loss over a four-year period from using brokers. 167
Shippers have discontinued using brokers,16 and carriers have called
for their elimination from the transportation industry.
169
Carriers, shippers and reputable brokers agree on one thing: the
image of brokers needs improvement and this improvement will occur
only if brokers conduct business in a professional manner.170 Broker-
age is a service business that depends on trust.171 The brokerage in-
dustry will not achieve the trust it needs to prosper as long as the
duties and responsibilities of brokers remain uncertain.
161 Brokerage industry leaders claim that the negative publicity is attributable to the acts of
unlicensed transportation intermediaries. They claim that 80% of the broker complaints re-
ceived by the ICC relate to unlicensed intermediaries. See, e.g., Stachura, supra note 3, at 4.
162 Brown, supra note 34, at 35-36 (carriers reported losing up to $300,000 using brokers).
163 Barks, supra note 76, at 48 (author refers to brokers as "Godzillas" of deregulation).
164 MARTELL, supra note 5, at 39.
165 1987 Hearing, supra note 11, at 4 (statement of Senator Pressler).
166 1987 Hearing, supra note 11, at 3. (statement of Senator Packwood).
167 Brown, supra note 34, at 35-36.
168 EJ. Muller, Forwarders v. Brokers, 91 DIsrlUatrnoN 38 (1992) (brokers simply locate
freight for carriers and do not offer the same level of service or accountability shippers receive
from freight forwarders).
169 Russ, supra note 8, at 30 (quoting Forrest Baker) ("[t]he only carrier who will use a broker
is one who doesn't have freight").
170 See BROWN, supra note 5, at 3.





In a typical brokerage transaction, the broker sends a freight bill
to the shipper and the shipper sends payment directly to the broker. 72
The broker, in turn, remits the payment to the delivering carrier, re-
taining a portion for its commission. 173 Unfortunately, it has become
all too common for brokers to collect freight charges from shippers
and then fail to remit any portion to the carriers."7
Motor carriers have complained for years of brokers who prolong
payment, fail to pay, or file bankruptcy to avoid payment. 75 Studies
indicate that nearly ten percent of brokers have failed to remit freight
charges to carriers, and the number is increasing.176 Due to the cur-
rent deregulated marketplace, disputes concerning the failure of bro-
kers to remit freight charges invariably lead to protracted litigation.
177
1. A Shipper's Double Jeopardy
As a general rule, the shipper has the primary obligation to pay
the carrier's freight charges,'78 but often freight charges are paid by
the shipper to a broker or other transportation intermediary. 79 All
too frequently, these intermediaries fail to pay the carrier which physi-
cally delivered the freight.180 In such cases, the delivering carrier fre-
quently seeks payment from the shipper. In recent years, shippers
172 Brown, supra note 34, at 33 (in some cases, the carrier bills the shipper for the delivery
and then remits a portion of the shipper's payment to the broker).
173 The amount of broker's commission is determined by agreement between the broker and
carrier and usually ranges between ten and 15 percent of the freight charges. See, e.g., Dinell,
supra note 22, at 11 (broker's commission is usually 12-13% of bill). It is not unusual, however,
for a broker's commission to exceed 35% of the freight charges. Practices of Property Brokers,
49 M.C.C. 277, 309 (1949). There are no limitations on the amount of fees a broker may charge.
45 FED. REr. 31140,31141 (1980) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 1045) (proposed May 12, 1980).
The broker's revenue is dependent upon finding a carrier willing to haul the freight for a price
lower than that offered by the shipper. Brown, supra note 37, at 45.
174 1987 Hearing, supra note 11, at 3-5; Milan Express Co. v. Western Sur. Co., 886 F.2d 783,
784 (6th Cir. 1989). As a practical matter, shippers should require brokers to execute a written
contract whereby the broker agrees to be solely responsible for the delivering carrier's freight
charges. See generally Muller, supra note 168, at 38.
175 BNA Daily Report for Executives, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNA File, DER
No. 219; Pg. A-16 (Nov. 16, 1987).
176 Andel, supra note 49, at 24 (of the 6,700 licensed brokers, 500 have been reported by at
least one carrier for non-payment of freight bills exceeding $100).
177 This assumes, of course, that it is economically feasible for the carrier or shipper to pursue
such litigation. Very often, the costs of retaining a lawyer to pursue the claim will far exceed the
amount of the claim itself, which generally does not exceed $2,000. 1987 Hearing, supra note 11,
at 13-14.
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have been repeatedly sued by carriers seeking "double payment." In
all such cases, the shipper paid the broker, but the broker absconded
with the funds never to be seen again. The liability in these cases
often depends on common law contract and agency principles. 81
These suits involve a battle of two innocent parties, both of whom
were duped by fast-talking, undercapitalized brokers.
The most recent decision in this area is ANR Freight System, Inc.
v. Weldbend Corporation."s In that case, Fleet-Rail, Inc., an ICC-li-
censed broker, 83 was occasionally hired by Weldbend Corporation to
arrange for the transportation of Weldbend's freight. In some in-
stances, Fleet-Rail contracted with ANR Freight Systems, Inc.
("ANR"), an ICC-licensed common carrier, to physically deliver the
freight.184 Fleet-Rail was named as the "carrier" on the bill of lading,
and Weldbend was named as the "shipper."' 85 ANR never had any
contact with Weldbend, other than when ANR's drivers arrived at
Weldbend's facility to pick up the freight.18 6 After delivery, Fleet-Rail
would send a freight bill to Weldbend, which Weldbend would pay
directly to Fleet-Rail.'8 7 ANR would then send a separate freight bill
to Fleet-Rail, which Fleet-Rail was supposed to pay to ANR from its
own accounts. 188 Over a two-year period, Fleet-Rail failed to remit
more than $80,000 to ANR.189 ANR did not inform Weldbend of
Fleet-Rail's arrearages until after Fleet-Rail filed bankruptcy. 19
At trial, the court observed that a shipper is primarily liable for a
carrier's freight charges, but nevertheless found in favor of Weldbend
for three reasons.' 9 ' First, Fleet-Rail was not an agent of Weldbend,
181 Joseph Steinfeld, Jr., When Is a Third Party Liable, 90 Dxsm rroN 90; MARTELL, supra
note 5, at 77-78.
182 No. 90 C 1948, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3558 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 1993).
183 Id. at *2. Fleet-Rail was also an ICC-licensed common carrier, which on occasion hauled
freight with its own trucks, Ld.. Brokers may provide transportation themselves only if they have
been issued certificates or permits to provide such transportation. MARTELL, supra note 5, at 56.
184 Weldbend Corporation, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3558 at *3.
185 Id.
186 Id at *5.
187 Id. at *4. It was undisputed that Weldbend paid Fleet-Rail in full for all of the deliveries
in question.
188 Id. at *4.
189 Id. at *4.
190 Id. at *4-5. For almost two years, ANR attempted to collect the arrearages from Fleet-
Rail. ANR chose not to inform Weldbend of the arrearages, fearing that Weldbend would ter-
minate its relationship with Fleet-Rail, which would most likely cause Fleet-Rail to go out of
business. Weldbend first learned of the arrearages when it was served with a copy of ANR's
complaint. Id.
191 See also Southern Refrigerated Transp. Co. v. RLN fraffic Unlimited, No. 83 C 2745, at 6




as ANR had argued. 19 2 Fleet-Rail set its own prices, chose its own
carriers, sent out its own invoices, and received payment in its own
name, all of which indicated that Fleet-Rail was an independent third-
party.193 Second, there was no contract between Weldbend and ANR.
The parties' conduct unequivocally demonstrated that there were two
separate contracts between the parties, one between Fleet-Rail and
ANR, and one between Fleet-Rail and Weldbend. 94 Finally, ANR's
failure to notify Weldbend of Fleet-Rail's arrearages equitably es-
topped ANR from recovering the charges from Weldbend. 195
Likewise, in Glosson Enterprises, Inc. v. Rexcel Company,96 a
carrier sought payment of freight charges from a shipper who had al-
ready paid an unlicensed broker for the deliveries. In facts very simi-
lar to those in Weldbend Corporation, the carrier argued that it had an
enforceable contract with the shipper and that the broker was an
agent of the shipper. Rejecting these arguments, the court held that
there was no contract between the shipper and carrier because the
carrier was not named in the bills of lading and did not send freight
bills to the shipper; all of the carrier's contacts were with the bro-
ker.197 The court also declared that there was no principal-agent rela-
tionship between the shipper and the broker. The broker "operated
in a completely independent manner and was not subject to any con-
trol or direction of [the shipper]."'198
International shippers are not immune to broker abuse. In Far-
rell Lines, Inc. v. Titan Industrial Corporation,199 an ocean carrier
brought suit against an international shipper to recover freight charges
for the shipment of steel between Africa and the United States. The
shipper paid a broker for the delivery, but the broker failed to remit
payment to the carrier.200 Although finding that the middleman was
carrier for double payment); Brown, supra note 34, at 33 ("once shipper pays the broker, the
shipper has no further financial obligation to the carrier"); Muller, supra note 168, at 38 (shipper
not liable to carrier once payment is made to broker); Fuerst, supra note 9, at 46 (there is no
double jeopardy for freight bills when a shipper elects to deal with a broker).
192 Weldbend Corporation, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3558, at *9.
193 Weldbend Corporation, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3558, at *9. Actually, the court noted that
Fleet-Rail was more an agent of ANR than of Weldbend. Weldbend Corporation, 1993 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3558, at *4.
194 Weldbend Corporation, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3558, at *9.
195 Weldbend Corporation, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3558, at *9-10.
196 1984 Fed. Carr. Cases 83,137 (D. Mass. Jan. 18, 1984).
197 IL
198 Id
199 306 F. Supp. 1348 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
200 Id. at 1349. The middleman in this case was an international freight forwarder, but the
analysis of the double payment issues would be the same as that for freight brokers.
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an independent contractor and not the agent of either the shipper or
carrier, the court concluded that the carrier's extension of credit to the
intermediary precluded the carrier from collecting freight charges
from the shipper. 0
On the other hand, a number of decisions have come down in
favor of the carriers. For instance, in Ranger Transportation, Inc. v.
Wal-Mart Stores,2 2 a shipper was compelled to pay a carrier's freight
charges, even though the shipper had previously made payment to a
transportation intermediary.2 ' 3 Similarly, in Dal-Tile Corporation and
Red Arrow Freight Lines, Inc.,204 a common carrier brought suit
against a shipper seeking payment of freight charges. The shipper had
already paid an unlicensed broker for these same deliveries. Both liti-
gants agreed to refer the case to the ICC for a determination of
whether it was an "unreasonable practice" for a carrier to collect
freight charges from a shipper who had already paid a broker for the
deliveries.20 5 The ICC determined that it was not an "unreasonable
practice" for carriers to collect double payments from shippers.
In recent years there has been a profusion of broker litigation,
much of which involves a shipper's double payment. 0 6 Resolving
these disputes on common law principles leads to inconsistent out-
comes, which itself breeds more litigation. The prospect of "double
payment" undoubtedly puts a chill on both domestic and international
trade. Even if shippers can avoid double payment, they incur
thousands of dollars in defense costs. All of this can be averted by
enacting responsible regulations.
2. Carrier v. Broker
It has also become common for delivering carriers to bring suit
against brokers for unpaid freight charges.207 For instance, in Sovran
201 Id. at 1350-51.
202 903 F.2d 1185 (8th Cir. 1990).
203 Id. at 1187. The decision did not specify the type of transportation intermediary involved.
204 No. 40437, 1990 I.C.C. LEXIS 350 (I.C.C. May 15, 1990).
205 Id. at *3-4; see also 49 U.S.C. § 10701(a) (prohibiting any unreasonable practices in the
collection of freight charges).
206 Double payment cases are also prevalent in Canada. See generally M. Scott Watson, Ship-
pers, Load Brokers, and Carriers; Who Bears the Loss When the Load Broker Defaults? 60
TRANSp. P.Ac. J. 29 (Fall 1992) (reviewing various litigation in Canada and proposing risk
abatement measures stemming from the role played by load brokers in the shipper, broker, and
carrier relationship).
207 There has also been litigation between brokers and shippers over unpaid freight charges;
see, eg., Rumm Transp., Inc. v. General Motors Corp., No. 86-CV-40562-FL, 1988 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18360 (Jan. 19, 1988).
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Bank Southeast v. ICB Transportation Services,2°8 a common carrier
sued a licensed broker to recover freight charges, claiming that the
broker received payment from the shipper, but failed to remit any
portion thereof to the carrier. 20 9 The broker countered with the argu-
ment that shippers, not brokers, have the primary obligation to pay a
carrier's freight charges. The court sided with the carrier, concluding
that "[i]f a broker bills and collects for freight charges, it assumes the
shipper's principal payment obligation to the authorized carrier which
transported the shipment. '210 The court based its ruling on 49 C.F.R.
§ 1045.10, which provides: "Where the broker acts on behalf of a per-
son bound by law or a Commission regulation as to the transmittal of
bills or payments, the broker must also abide by the law or regulations
which apply to that person."21' This regulation, according to the
court, shifted payment liability as a matter of law from the shipper to
the broker.212 According to this reasoning, if the broker undertakes
the duty to bill and collect freight charges from the shipper, the broker
is obligated to pay the carrier even if the shipper fails to make
payment.
213
Conversely, in United Shipping Company v. Tucker Company,
2 1 4
a carrier unsuccessfully asserted an action against a broker for unpaid
freight charges. The court in that case noted that although the shipper
has the primary obligation to pay transportation costs, this liability
may be shifted to a third party.215 Neither the Interstate Commerce
Act nor 49 C.F.R. § 1045.10, however, shifts liability for unpaid freight
charges to a broker.216 On the contrary, the primary liability for
freight charges may be shifted only by contract or explicit actions of
the parties.217 Mere transmittal of payment from a shipper to a bro-
208 No. 3-89-250, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9326 (Jul. 13, 1991).
209 Id. at *2-3. The broker failed to remit approximately $28,000 to the delivering carrier. ld.
at *34.
210 Ld. at *4-5. The broker billed the shippers from the outset and looked solely to the ship-
pers for payment. Moreover, the broker, not the carrier, was named in the bills of lading. Id. at
*24.
211 49 C.F.R. § 1045.10 (1992).
212 Sovran Bank Southeast, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9326, at *6.
213 MARTELL, supra note 5, at 57; William Tcker, What Brokers Can and Can't Do for You,
DISTRIBUTION, Feb. 1985, at 50; but see, BRowN, supra note 5, at 19 (absent an agreement, the
broker is generally not liable for freight charges).
214 474 N.W.2d 835 (Minn. App. 1991).
215 United Shipping Company, supra note 214, at 840.
216 United Shipping Company, supra note 214, at 840-41 n.2.
217 United Shipping Company, supra note 214, at 841.
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ker is insufficient evidence of a broker's acceptance of primary re-
sponsibility for freight charges.218
As in the carrier/shipper cases, actions by carriers against brokers
have become commonplace. This litigation adds expense and uncer-
tainty to an industry already teetering on financial disaster.
3. Timely Payment of Freight Charges
The law obligates a shipper to pay a carrier's freight charges
within fifteen days of delivery.219 It is unclear, however, whether this
rule applies to brokerage transactions. The ICC has suggested that
brokers must make payment to carriers within fifteen days of deliv-
ery.220 But strangely enough, shippers are not required to make pay-
ment to brokers within the fifteen-day window. 221 As a result, a
broker may be compelled to pay a carrier before it receives payment
from the shipper. This, of course, could lead to serious cash flow
problems for brokers. Fortunately, this problem can be corrected with
a set of regulations like those proposed in this article, without adding
any financial or administrative burden on brokers.
B. Undercharges
Common carriers are required to publish their rates in a tariff
filed with the ICC.222 The filed-rate governs the legal relationship be-
tween the shipper and carrier 23 and is the rate which must be charged
to all shippers alike.22 4 It is illegal for a carrier to agree to haul freight
for any price other than the filed-rate.2 2 Ignorance or misquotation
of rates is not an excuse for charging either less or more than the filed-
rate.226
218 United Shipping Company, supra note 214, at 841.
219 See 49 C.F.R. § 1320.2 (1992), which provides that "[u]nless a different credit period has
been established by tariff publication pursuant to paragraph (d) of this section, the credit period
is 15 days."
220 1987 Hearing, supra note 11, at 18, 39 (majority of brokers delay payment from 35 to 75
days). Although bound by ICC credit regulations, the broker who pays his bills in less than 30
days is the exception. Bassing, supra note 33, at 4.
221 MARTELL, supra note 5, at 4 (brokers are required to comply with I.C.C. credit rules in
making payment to carriers, but shippers are not obligated by ICC rules in making payment to
brokers).
222 49 U.S.C. § 10762 (1992).
223 Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 126 (1990).
224 Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. R.R., 284 U.S. 370, 384 (1932).
225 Maislin, 497 U.S. at 127 n.9.
226 Maislin, 497 U.S. at 127.
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If a carrier agrees to haul freight for a shipper at a rate less than
the filed-rate, the carrier can recover the difference between the filed-
rate and the negotiated rate, which is known as the "undercharge."'227
Regardless of the inequities of this rule, carriers and their representa-
tives in bankruptcy have asserted thousands of actions against ship-
pers to recover undercharges. Liability in these cases is relatively
straightforward. Undercharge cases take on a new complexity, how-
ever, in brokerage transactions. Some courts have allowed carriers to
collect undercharges from brokers,' but others have not.229 As for
the liability of shippers, some commentators have suggested that bro-
kers provide an excellent shield for shippers against undercharge lia-
bility.23 0 But this would seem true only if the shipper is in a
jurisdiction which shifts primary payment liability from the shipper to
the broker as a matter of law.23 1 The only sure way to protect ship-
pers, brokers and carriers is to pass regulations allocating responsibil-
ity for undercharges. 232
C. Broker's Bond
To protect motor carriers and the shipping public, the ICC will
issue a broker's license only if the applicant files a bond or other type
of security approved by the ICC.233 The bonds are intended to protect
both motor carriers and shippers from property abuse and to guaran-
tee payment of past-due freight charges.23 4 Originally, the bond
amount was $5,000,235 but it was increased to $10,000 in 1978.23 The
original language of the standard broker's bond identified travelers
and shippers, but not motor carriers, as the intended beneficiaries of
227 Thrasher Trucking Co. v. Empire Tubulars, Inc., 983 F.2d 46, 47 (5th Cir. 1993).
228 Atlantis Express, Inc. v. Unicorn Transp. Sys., Inc., 764 F. Supp. 135, 138 (D. Minn. 1991),
reversed and remanded on other grounds sub nom., Atlantis Express Co. v. Standard Transp.
Serv., Inc., 955 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1992); accord Atlantis Express, Inc. v. LL Transp. Serv., Inc.,
481 N.W.2d 79 (Minn. App. 1992).
229 Johanson Transp. Serv., Petition for Declaratory Order, No. MC-C-30079, 1988 I.C.C.
LEXIS 298 (Sep. 8, 1988) (carrier's attempt to collect undercharges from broker is an unreason-
able practice).
230 Andel, supra note 49, at 24.
231 See, e.g., Sovran Bank Southeast, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9326, at *6.
232 Congress has considered and rejected a number of bills in the last three years aimed a
rectifying the entire filed-rate dispute. See generally ICC Chairman Gail McDonald's Address to
Raritan Traffic Club on Current Issues, ICC's Role and Future Trends, I.C.C. News Release,
1993 Westlaw 69259, at *6 (Mar. 10, 1993).
233 49 C.F.R. § 1043.2 (1992).
234 JoHiN A. APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INs. L. AND PRACICE § 6142 (Supp. 1991).
235 Motor Carrier Ins. for Protection of the Public, 1 M.C.C. 45, 59 (1936).
236 Entry Control of Brokers, 126 M.C.C. at 526.
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the bond.23 7 In 1987, the ICC redefined the parameters of the bro-
ker's bond, stating that the bond had always protected motor carriers,
as well as shippers and travelers.23 8
Brokers can satisfy the security requirement by filing a $10,000
bond or establishing a $10,000 trust fund.3 9 The trust fund must be
maintained at a financial institution which is licensed or qualified to
do business in a state or the District of Columbia.24 ° The trustee must
pay all claims which arise out of the broker's failure to perform its
arrangements for transportation made while the trust agreement was
in effect. 241
Almost everyone in the transportation industry agrees that
$10,000 is not sufficient to protect shippers and carriers from broker
abuse.2 4 2 The bond usually covers less than ten percent of the claims
asserted against brokers.24 3 In ANR Freight Systems, Inc v. Weldbend
Corporation,244 for example, the broker failed to remit more than
$80,000 of freight charges to just one carrier.
237 Milan Express Co., 886 F.2d at 784 (the primary purpose of Congress in regulation motor
transportation was to protect carriers and the shipping public against dishonest or financially
unstable middlemen).
238 Clarification of Ins. Regulation, No. MC-183, 3 I.C.C.2d 689 (1987). The interpretation
and construction of a broker's bond is a question of federal law. Expressco, Inc. v. State Surety
Co., No. 88-341-I, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 846, at *6 (Dec. 29, 1989). Because the bonds are
required, promulgated and regulated by the ICC, federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction
in bond disputes. Milan Express Co. v. Western Sur. Co., 886 F.2d 783, 786-87 (6th Cir. 1989).
Interpleader is an appropriate procedure in broker bond disputes. Frontier Ins. Co. v. Mission
Carrier, Inc., No. 91-5151, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12904, at *12 (D.NJ. Aug. 24, 1992).
239 Annual premiums on broker bonds range substantially depending on the broker's net
worth. Premiums could be as low as $100 a year or as high as $500. MARTELL, supra note 5, at
33. Due to the large number of fly-by-night brokers who have entered the market in the last 15
years, brokers are now having difficulty securing bonds. ICC Chairman Gail McDonald's Ad-
dress to Raritan Traffic Club on Current Issues, ICC's Role and Future Trends, I.C.C. News
Release, 1993 Westlaw 69259, at *4 (Mar. 10, 1993).
240 Property Brokers Security For The Protection Of The Public, 3 I.C.C.2d 916, 1987 M.C.C.
LEXIS 297, at *17 (1987).
241 Property Brokers Security For The Protection Of The Public, 4 I.C.C.2d 358, 1988 I.C.C.
LEXIS 255, at *19 (1988). The prescribed trust fund agreement provides for a 30-day period in
which the broker can replenish the fund to the $10,000 level if the fund is drawn upon. If the
broker fails to replenish the fund within 30 days, the trust fund ceases to satisfy the ICC's secur-
ity requirement.
242 1987 Hearing, supra note 11, at 14; Russ, supra note 8, at 30 (counsel for Transportation
Brokers Conference of America proposed increasing bond to $50,000); MARTELL, supra note 5,
at 7.
243 Muller, supra note 168, at 38; 1987 Hearing, supra note 11, at 24-25 (the $10,000 broker's
bond is a "joke"; the total claims against intermediaries are often six figures, and each claimant
is lucky to get ten cents on the dollar).




An increase in the amount of the bond would drive the fly-by-
night brokers out of the market.245 With that in mind, carriers have
petitioned the ICC to increase the bond to $100,000, but the Commis-
sion believes that $10,000 is an adequate amount and that any in-
crease, while facilitating full recovery in some instances, would
discourage brokers from entering the brokerage business. 46 Accord-
ing to the ICC, the fact that surety companies thoroughly investigate
bond applicants all but eliminates questionable brokers from the
market.247
The ICC's refusal to increase the amount of the broker's bond is
another example of the fact that the ICC is more interested in pro-
moting free enterprise than in protecting the shipping public. All
agree that $10,000 is inadequate, but the ICC refuses to enact any
regulation that even remotely restricts entry into the brokerage indus-
try.248 The time has come to increase the bond to a level that will
prevent seriously undercapitalized applicants from entering the
market.
D. Cargo Liability
Common carriers and freight forwarders are liable for the actual
amount of any loss or damage caused to a shipper's cargo.249 As such,
they are required by law to maintain cargo liability insurance.25 0 Bro-
kers, on the other hand, are not ordinarily liable for cargo loss or dam-
age and, therefore, are not required to maintain liability insurance.2
Brokers merely act as intermediaries and do not usually handle
245 1987 Hearing, supra note 11, at 14-15 (comments of Sen. Kasten).
246 Petition For Investigatory Rulemaking Transp. Broker Bonds, No. MC-5, 1991 M.C.C.
LEXIS 133, at *6 (I.C.C. Aug. 6, 1991) ("We continue to believe that the $10,000 amount of the
security is reasonably adequate for the purpose for which it was intended, to define a minimum
level of financial responsibility for brokers to ensure the broker's continuing financial ability to
operate properly.")
247 Id. at *8.
248 See generally Petition for Investigatory Rulemaking, 1991 M.C.C. LEXIS 133, at *13
(Commissioner Simmons, dissenting).
249 Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Alliance Shippers, Inc., 654 F. Supp. 840,841 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
250 Removal Of Regulations Governing Cargo Liability Ins., Surety Bonds Or Other Security
Required By Motor Common Carriers Of Property And Freight Forwarders, No. MC-5, 1990
M.C.C. LEXIS 75, at *2 (I.C.C. Apr. 26, 1990).
251 Travelers Indemnity Co., 654 F. Supp. at 841. But see, FDL Foods, Inc. v. Kokesch Truck-
ing, Inc., 233 Ill. App. 3d 245, 253, 599 N.E.2d 20, 25 (1992) (court noting that cargo liability
extends to brokers under 49 U.S.C. § 10924(b) and (e)).
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cargo.25 2 If cargo loss or damage occurs on a brokerage shipment, the
shipper ordinarily has recourse only against the delivering carrier.
253
Although brokers are not ordinarily responsible for cargo loss or
damage claims, there are three ways in which they may face such lia-
bility. First, brokers may assume cargo liability by contract. This
often occurs when the bill of lading is issued with the broker named as
the "carrier. ''2 4 Second, brokers can face cargo liability if they fail to
act with reasonable care in placing the cargo with a delivering car-
rier.25 5 This is especially true if they hire carriers who are not prop-
erly insured; brokers should always inspect a carrier's cargo certificate
before delivery.256 Finally, if brokers provide services beyond merely
arranging transportation they may face exposure to cargo loss on the
theory that they were acting as common carriers.257 The greater the
scope of the services offered, the more likely it is that brokers will be
held liable for cargo damage or loss.258
In the last few years, the transportation industry has witnessed
the genesis of lawsuits involving a broker's liability for cargo loss. For
instance, in Tokio Marine and Fire Insurance Company v. Amato Mo-
tors, Inc.,259 a broker was held liable for cargo loss where the broker
held itself out to the public as performing the services of a common
carrier.260 In addition, in FDL Foods, Inc. v. Kokesch Trucking,
Inc. ,261 the court held two brokers liable for the damage caused to the
shipper's freight. The court determined that 49 U.S.C. § 10924 ex-
tends cargo liability to brokers.262
Regulations are needed to allocate the responsibility for cargo
loss or damage. These regulations will not only decrease litigation,
252 Property Brokers Security For The Protection Of The Public, 4 I.C.C.2d 358, 1988 I.C.C.
LEXIS 255, at *20-21 (Mar. 14, 1988). Most shippers believe that brokers are liable for cargo
damage. Russ, supra note 8, at 30.
253 Brown, supra note 34, at 32. Although not liable for damages, reputable brokers often
assist shippers in recovering from the carrier. Brown, supra note 43, at 9.
254 See BROWN, supra note 5, at 84.
255 BROWN, supra note 5, at 84.
256 Removal Of Regulations Governing Cargo Liability Ins., 1990 M.C.C. LEXIS 75, at *6-7
(cargo requirements are vital to the brokerage industry; although brokers are not ordinarily
liable for cargo loss, brokers can become liable in the event the carriers they retain are not
properly insured).
257 BROWN, supra note 5, at 84.
258 BROWN, supra note 5, at 85.
259 770 F. Supp. 426 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
260 Id. at 428. In its sales literature, the broker held itself out as an actual transporter of
freight, even though the sales literature explicitly stated that it was a broker.
261 233 Ill. App. 3d 245, 599 N.E.2d 20 (1992).
262 233 II. App. 3d at 253, 599 N.E.2d at 25.
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they will also place the parties to a brokerage transaction on notice of
their respective liabilities. The brokerage industry will only come of
age and be fully accepted when cargo liability is properly allocated.263
E. Tort Liability
The last decade has also witnessed the inception of personal in-
jury litigation against freight brokers. In Johnson v. Pacific Inter-
mountain Express Company,' a freight broker hired a motor carrier
to deliver freight for a shipper. While enroute, the carrier was in-
volved in an accident, causing personal injuries and property dam-
age.265 The persons injured in the accident brought suit against the
broker, claiming that it was vicariously liable for the carrier's ac-
tions.2 1 The court found against the broker, concluding that the bro-
ker and carrier were involved in a joint venture and, as such, the
broker was liable for the carrier's negligence.267
In contrast, in Tartaglione v. Shaw's Express, Inc.,268 two persons
injured in an accident with an unlicensed carrier sued the broker, al-
leging that the broker was responsible for their injuries because it
failed to comply with ICC regulations mandating that a broker place
goods into the stream of commerce only with a certified motor car-
rier.269 The court dismissed the plaintiffs' suit, concluding that
"[a]lthough Section 10924 of the ICA requires a property broker to
provide for transportation only by a motor carrier holding a certificate
or permit issued by the ICC, the ICA does not create a private cause
of action based on violations of its provisions."270
These cases are typical of the profusion of broker litigation now
working its way through the state and federal courts. Most, if not all,
broker litigation is attributable to three factors: first, the eased entry
controls of the 1980 Act which allowed seriously undercapitalized and
crooked brokers to enter the market; second, the lack of regulation
defining the duties and responsibilities of brokers, especially with re-
gard to the payment and collection of freight charges; and third, the
fact that responsibility for cargo loss and personal injury has never
263 See generally MARTELL, supra note 5, at 45 (many brokers already maintain liability
coverage).
264 662 S.W.2d 237 (Mo. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 973 (1984).
265 Id. at 238.
266 Id. at 239.
267 Id. at 241-42.
268 790 F. Supp. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
269 Id. at 440.
270 Id. at 441.
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been allocated among the parties to a brokerage transaction. Many of
the cases mentioned in this section could have been avoided with the
enactment of responsible regulations.
V. SOLUTIONS TO THE BROKERAGE INDUSTRY'S PROBLEMS
The brokerage industry needs financial stability and certainty to
prosper. Deregulation has removed the trust that was once instilled in
the brokerage industry.271 The lack of financial stability of brokers
has caused many shippers, both domestic and international, to utilize
other services. Responsible regulations are needed to cure the bro-
kerage industry's ills. Accordingly, I propose that the following regu-
lations be enacted, either by Congress or the ICC,272 to stabilize
brokerage operations. The proposed regulations, for the most part,
are meant to supplement, not replace, the few broker regulations still
on the books.2 73 The financial stability and certainty that will be at-
tained by the proposed regulations far outweigh the minimal financial
and administrative burdens they may impose on brokers.
A. Proposed Regulation Number 1
First and foremost, the brokerage industry needs to allocate re-
sponsibility among shippers, carriers and brokers. Allocation of liabil-
ity, as the following regulation proposes, will decrease litigation and
increase stability in the brokerage industry:
Proposed Regulation No. 1: A freight broker is an independent interme-
diary which does not act on behalf of either the shipper or carrier.27 4
This proposed regulation is meant to replace the common law princi-
pal-agent disputes involved in most broker litigation.
B. Proposed Regulation Number 2
The second proposed regulation is aimed at the brokerage indus-
try's most pressing problem: collection and payment of freight bills.
In the current deregulated marketplace, disputes concerning freight
charges are battled out in court using state common law principles to
ascertain federal statutory rights. The following regulation is aimed at
halting the senseless onslaught of litigation:
Proposed Regulation No. 2: If a broker bills and collects freight charges
from a shipper, the broker assumes the shipper's primary payment obli-
271 See generally 24 TRANsP. & DISRIBUToN 21.
272 Preferably, the regulations should be enacted by the ICC as part of 49 C.F.R. pts. 1043-45.
273 See 49 C.F.R. pts. 1043-45 (1992).




gation for all lawful charges owed to the authorized carrier(s) which
transported the freight. Payment by the shipper to an authorized broker
discharges the shipper's liability for all lawful charges owed to the car-
rier(s) which transported the freight. All parties to brokerage transac-
tions shall comply with the credit requirements of 49 C.F.R. § 1320.2.275
Enactment of this proposed regulation should significantly reduce
the amount of brokerage litigation and thereby stabilize the entire in-
dustry. Cases in which carriers sued shippers for double payment will
become extinct, as will cases in which carriers sued brokers for pay-
ment of freight charges. Claims by carriers for "undercharges" will be
expedited, since the proposed statute makes clear that brokers assume
the shippers' primary payment obligation for "all lawful charges"
owed to the carrier. Finally, the last sentence of the proposed regula-
tion requires all parties to a brokerage transaction to make payment
within the fifteen-day credit window set forth in 49 C.F.R. § 1320.2.
Also, unlike the current common law approach, Proposed Regulation
No. 2 places all parties to a brokerage transaction on notice of their
respective duties and responsibilities as to freight charges.
C. Proposed Regulation Number 3
Clarification of payment duties is not enough to put the broker-
age industry back on the right track. Regulations also are needed to
prevent seriously undercapitalized applicants from entering the bro-
kerage industry. Brokers act as conduits for millions of dollars of
freight charges, collecting the charges from shippers and remitting
them to carriers. As such, a certain measure of financial responsibility
is needed to instill trust into the brokerage industry. The following
regulation will aid in determining whether an applicant is fit, willing
and able to perform the services of a freight broker:
Proposed Regulation No. 3: A property broker must have a security
bond or trust fund in effect for $50,000. The Commission will not issue a
property broker license until a surety bond or trust fund for the full lim-
its of liability prescribed herein is in effect. The broker license is effec-
tive only as long as a surety bond or trust fund remains in effect and shall
ensure the financial responsibility of the broker.276
Proposed Regulation No. 3 provides an extra level of security in
brokerage transactions. Admittedly, many current broker disputes in-
275 This regulation is meant to replace 49 C.F.R1 § 1045.10 (1992). In 1986, the ICC consid-
ered and rejected a proposed regulation that would have made the shipper secondarily liable for
payment to the carrier, even if the shipper made payment to the broker. Senn Tucking Co., No.
39962, 1986 M.C.C. LEXIS 74 (I.C.C. Nov. 17, 1986).
276 Proposed Regulation No. 3 is derived from 49 C.F.R1 § 1043.4(a)(1992). The only modifi-
cation is an increase from $10,000 to $50,000.
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volve more than $50,000. But with the addition of the "trust fund"
requirement described below, $50,000 should be adequate to ensure
financial responsibility, while at the same time not excluding moder-
ately-capitalized applicants from the brokerage market.
D. Proposed Regulation Number 4
Intermediaries are charged with managing large sums of money
for other parties. It is essential, therefore, to ensure that they handle
such funds with the utmost care. Lawyers, stockbrokers and real es-
tate brokers are required to keep the funds they collect on behalf of
other parties in a separate account and are prohibited from commin-
gling these funds with their personal money.2 77 In the current deregu-
lated marketplace, freight brokers are not required to maintain
separate accounts for the money they collect from shippers. There is
also no ban against commingling of funds.278 As a result, dishonest
and undercapitalized brokers are collecting funds from shippers and,
instead of remitting this money to carriers, they are using it for per-
sonal expenses. The following regulation is levelled at this
misconduct:
Proposed Regulation No. 4: Freight charges collected by a broker from a
shipper or consignee are held in a fiduciary capacity for the benefit of
the authorized carrier(s) which transported the freight. These funds
shall be maintained in a separate account and shall not be commingled
with personal funds or other types of funds. After each delivery of
freight, the broker may withdraw its commission from the funds only
after all lawful charges of the authorized carrier(s) which transported the
freight have been paid. Failure to comply with this regulation may result
in revocation of authorization, fines or imprisonment.279
Proposed Regulation No. 4, together with the other proposed
regulations, will provide the financial security so desperately needed
in the brokerage industry.
E. Proposed Regulation Number 5
Common carriers have primary responsibility for cargo loss and
personal injury and, as such, are required by law to maintain liability
insurance.280 Freight brokers, on the other hand, are not required to
277 See supra note 18.
278 The ICC has considered and refused to ban commingling of funds. See Petition for Inves-
tigatory Rulemaking Transportation Broker Bonds, No. MC-5, 1991 M.C.C. LEXIS 133 (I.C.C.
Aug. 6, 1991). See also Andel, supra note 49, at 24.
279 If enacted, appropriate penalties for violation of this proposed regulation will need to be
enacted.




carry insurance because they are not ordinarily involved in the physi-
cal transportation of freight. In the last few years, however, the trans-
portation sector has witnessed the genesis of cargo liability and
personal injury litigation against freight brokers. Most of these suits
result from brokers hiring unauthorized and uninsured carriers.
Regulations are needed to allocate responsibility for cargo loss
and personal injury among common carriers and freight brokers. Be-
cause carriers have the primary responsibility for physically transport-
ing freight and because they are already required to maintain
minimum levels of insurance, the proposed regulation continues to
place the primary liability for cargo loss and personal injury claims on
carriers. Conversely, brokers, who do not ordinarily transport freight,
should be held liable only when they hire unauthorized or uninsured
carriers. The following regulation allocates responsibility for cargo
loss and personal injury claims and requires brokers to maintain a sort
of "excess" insurance for those cases where they hire unauthorized or
uninsured carriers:
Proposed Regulation No. 5: A freight broker may not operate until it
has filed with the Commission an appropriate certificate of insurance,
qualifications as a self-insurer, or other securities or agreements, in the
amounts prescribed for motor carriers in 49 C.F.R. § 1043.2, for loss or
damage to cargo. In addition, a freight broker may not operate until it
has filed with the Commission an appropriate certificate of insurance,
qualifications as a self-insurer, or other securities or agreements, in the
amounts prescribed for motor carriers in 49 C.F.R. § 1043.2, conditioned
to pay any final judgment recovered against such broker for bodily in-
jury to or the death of any person, or loss or damage to property (except
cargo) of others. Freight brokers shall comply with 49 C.F.R. §§ 1084.4
to 1084.9 (as prescribed for freight forwarders) with respect to all other
security requirements. Provided, however, that a freight broker is liable
for the losses stated above only when it hires or retains an unauthorized,
uninsured or underinsured carrier.281
If the five regulations proposed in this article are adopted, the
profusion of brokerage litigation will substantially decrease and bro-
kers will begin to prosper. Proposed Regulations 1 and 2 clarify the
law without causing any administrative or financial burden. The bur-
den that may result from Proposed Regulations 3, 4 and 5 is substan-
tially outweighed by the stability and trust these regulations will instill
into the brokerage industry.
281 Proposed Regulation No. 5 is derived from 49 C.F.R. § 1084.2 (1992), which prescribes the
security requirements for freight forwarders.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In 1935, Congress enacted extensive legislation that stifled the
brokerage industry for the next forty years. In 1980, Congress re-
versed course and deregulated the brokerage industry. Since that
time, brokers, who were once reputable transportation intermediaries,
are now distrusted by everyone in the transportation business. The
all-or-nothing solutions of Congress have crippled the brokerage in-
dustry and have led to a profusion of expensive and unproductive liti-
gation. This article proposes a middleground between the stifling
regulations of 1935 and the free-for-all deregulation of 1980. The pro-
posed regulations will decrease brokerage litigation, add stability to
the brokerage industry, and instill trust into an industry that so des-
perately needs it. A stable brokerage industry is necessary to stimu-
late trade in the current global market.
